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1.1. Research topic 
In September 2020, the Norwegian Commission of the Courts delivered a report to the Ministry 
of Justice concerning the independence of Norwegian courts.1 It emphasised that Norwegian 
courts enjoy significant independence, but simultaneously warned against tendencies in various 
European countries where elected bodies undermine judicial independence through reforms. In 
Poland, extensive statutory safeguards of judicial independence provided very limited 
protection against efforts by the ruling party to seize control of the courts. The consequent 
debates about judicial reform and ongoing article 7-proceedings against Poland illustrate that 
judicial independence has renewed actuality.2 
This thesis will examine a factor of great importance for judicial independence, namely 
appointment of judges, and assess to what degree the report’s suggested changes are necessary 
and sufficient for safeguarding judicial independence in changing societal circumstances. The 
choice of appointment mechanism varies greatly across jurisdictions, and there seems to be no 
clear consensus on which is most successful in securing independent courts.3 The situation in 
Poland demonstrate that judicial independence is fragile against political attacks if the 
appointment procedure does not sufficiently balance independence with other core values, 
especially democratic legitimacy. The delicate balancing act necessary for judicial 
independence to remain resilient during political turmoil will be a recurrent issue throughout 
the thesis.   
The focus of the research is how various government branches and external bodies are involved 
in the selection of appointees and formal appointment. Understanding this mechanism will 
require an analysis of current legal norms and the considerations on which the choice of 
selection mechanism is founded. A comparative approach will then be applied with the 
objective of understanding the significance context has on appointment procedure and, 
consequently, judicial independence in a legal culture. Comparative studies of Norwegian law 
often discuss other Nordic countries due to similar traditions, but I find that comparing one’s 
 
1 NOU 2020: 11. 
2 European Commission (2017); European Parliament (2020a); European Parliament (2020b). 
3 See Akkas (2004).  
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own jurisdiction to one very different in many respects makes for interesting observations and 
insights. Poland is currently triggering debates all over Europe due to rather rapid backsliding 
of the rule of law and judicial independence, occurring in real-time. The new Courts 
Commission report on reform is at least partly a product of these circumstances,4 and Poland is 
therefore, in my opinion, an especially interesting and relevant object of comparison.  
1.2. Terminology  
1.2.1. Judicial Independence  
The overarching research theme relates to the effect of appointment procedures on judicial 
independence. Judicial independence is considered a cornerstone of the rule of law and the right 
to an independent tribunal, enshrined in supranational instruments such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights. Independence involves “the ability of individual judges and the 
judiciary as a whole to perform their duties free of influence or control by other actors”,5 and 
the focus will be the collective independence of the institutions in the judiciary. In this context, 
independence provides a certain level of autonomy in daily operations, freedom from 
instruction prior to a judgment and from sanctions afterwards.6 The independence or 
impartiality of the individual judge from parties and other judges falls outside the scope of this 
thesis.  
Judicial independence is built on the principle of a separation of powers. It is widely held that 
in order for the judiciary to be independent, there ought to be a distinction between the powers 
attributed to the judiciary, the executive and the legislative branches.7 Such a separation in its 
modern form is more accurately described as a system of checks and balances rather than 
absolute separation, which is neither possible in its pure form nor necessarily desirable.8 These 
checks and balances can be viewed as shields and swords used by each branch of government 
in the inevitable tension between these powers, as tools for necessary intervention and 
 
4 NOU 2020: 11 at 2.2, p. 212 mentions Poland specifically.  
5 Swart (2019) para. 7.  
6 See Möllers (2019) p. 237.  
7 Shetreet (2012) p. 51.  
8 Barber (2013). 
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protection.9 This requires that core principles be secured in a constitutional and legislative 
framework.  
A distinction should be made between de facto and de jure judicial independence. According 
to Ríos-Figueroa and Staton, de jure judicial independence describes “formal rules designed to 
insulate judges from undue pressure, either from outside the judiciary or from within”.10 Such 
rules relate to how judicial appointments are organised in formal legal sources. The concept of 
de facto independence is “behavioral” and refers to autonomy in adjudication and that 
“decisions are enforced in practice”.11 When these concepts are identified as separate, 
increasing de jure independence through legislative measures does not necessarily cause an 
equivalent rise in de jure independence. As will be demonstrated, these might even be 
negatively correlated in certain contexts.  
1.2.2. Democratic legitimacy 
Judicial independence does not necessarily go hand in hand with total autonomy of the 
judiciary. Autonomy and self-regulation could even be contrary to certain principles of 
democracy. Two core values commonly cited as necessary modifications are democratic 
legitimacy and accountability. Accountability demands that “the judiciary as a whole maintain 
some level of responsiveness to society, as well as a high level of professionalism and quality 
on the part of its members”.12 However, the most important in the context of Norwegian 
appointments is democratic legitimacy, which is legitimacy derived from the democratic 
principles of governance. Democratic legitimacy is strongest when judicial appointments are 
conferred on democratically elected bodies, whose members represent the public.  
The Norwegian parliamentary form of government requires accountability to Parliament.13 
Judicial self-governance14 thus reduces democratic legitimacy, as it allows the judiciary to run 
its own affairs without restriction by the democratically elected branches.15 When the judiciary 
has the power to review legislation and executive actions, legitimacy demands that the other 
 
9 Ibid. 
10 Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2012) pp. 106-107. 
11 Ibid. p. 107.  
12 Garoupa and Ginsburg (2008) p. 57.  
13 Art. 15 of the Norwegian Constitution. 
14 I use “self-governance” in a broad sense, see Kosař (2018). 
15 NOU 1999: 19 at 7.5.1.1 emphasises the need for democratic control in appointments. 
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branches can influence judicial selection.16 But full control by the politically elected branches 
is not desirable, as it risks political influence over judicial functions. A certain counterbalance 
by judicial independence is therefore required to ensure that the courts adjudicate legal disputes 
autonomously.17  
1.2.3. Appointment procedure 
Judicial appointment procedures are amongst the most important statutory tools for improving 
judicial independence.18 An assessment of the Norwegian procedure requires addressing the 
role of the state branch with formal decisive authority over judicial appointments, but also the 
independence of the body that selects and recommends candidates to judicial positions. When 
such a body appears non-independent, it casts doubt on the independence of the judges 
appointed by this authority.19 This body’s composition, member selection, representation of 
judges and amount of actual influence on the final appointment will therefore also be examined 
in some depth. Administrative authority is briefly discussed, but promotions and discipline will 
not be addressed.  
Judicial independence is difficult to measure empirically, and comparative research on 
appointments therefore discuss the merit of various procedures’ impact on independence on a 
theoretical level.20 Appointment procedures vary greatly between jurisdictions, depending on 
the chosen balance between judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. Judicial self-
governance and autonomy arguably provide maximum de jure judicial independence. This 
enables courts to exercise more effective checks and balances, especially in a parliamentary 
system where government and Parliament are closely connected (such as when the ruling party 
has legislative majority). The drawback is that wide-ranging autonomy risks isolation, cronyism 
and lack of democratic legitimacy.  
On the other end of the spectrum is appointments that are political, exercised either by the 
executive or legislative branch or both in combination. Such a system maximizes democratic 
control and legitimacy but risks politically influencing judges in their decision-making. In 
 
16 Shetreet (2012) pp. 47-48. 
17 NOU 1999: 19 chapter 5. 
18 Melton and Ginsburg (2014). 
19 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12; A.K. and 
Others v. Sąd Najwyższy [GC] C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 para. 137. 
20 See Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009); Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2012); Jackson (2012). 
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between these polar extremes exist a variety of selection mechanisms, with an increasing 
tendency towards separating appointment of judges from political branches.21 Changes to 
judicial selection tend to “reflect a dialectic tension between the need to de-politicize the 
judiciary and the trend toward judicializing politics”.22 A popular solution is different variations 
of judicial councils,23 aimed at avoiding both polar extremes. How the procedure is designed in 
Norway and Poland will be the topic of chapters 2 and 3, respectively.  
1.2.4. Prerogative 
Both Norwegian and Polish scholars refer to appointment power in their country as a 
prerogative. In a modern Parliamentary context, the term ‘prerogative’ refers to a power 
bestowed on the head of state that does not require Parliamentary approval.24 Prerogatives 
therefore reference the constitutionally provided power of the Norwegian and Polish head of 
the executive branch. Norway is a Parliamentary constitutional monarchy, which means the 
power is conferred on the King in Council, exercised by the Government and symbolically 
signed by the Monarch. 25 Poland is a semi-presidential constitutional republic with a president 
and a prime minister.26 Judicial appointments being a constitutionally provided prerogative for 
the President therefore mean that appointments do not require approval from the Prime Minister 
or Parliament. Despite appearing similarly regulated in the two constitutions, widely different 
interpretation of the extent of the prerogative reveals large practical differences between the 
two countries’ judicial appointments.  
1.3. Methodology 
1.3.1. Comparative methodology 
In chapter 4, I will address at the Norwegian appointment procedure in light of a few selected 
features of the Polish appointment procedure. Using Polish appointments as reference point 
requires a comparative approach and method that establishes a common frame of reference. 
The scope of the thesis does not allow for a discussion on the merits of various comparative 
 
21 Seibert-Fohr (2012) p. 11. 
22 Garoupa and Ginsburg (2008) p. 61. 
23 Ibid. p. 3, estimating that 60 % of countries have such councils. See also Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009). 
24 Bradbury (2018).  
25 See Art. 15 of the Norwegian Constitution. 
26 McMenamin (2008); Sadurski (2019a) p. 45 ff. 
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approaches, so recognising functionalism as an apt starting point for a comparative study of 
appointments will have to be sufficient.27  
The functional comparative method is based on the premise that legal systems face similar 
problems, for which different measures are applied. 28 In order to analyse and compare two legal 
systems, it is necessary to formulate a problem based on function, present how the problem is 
solved and assess various similarities and differences. In this research, the problem is how 
appointment of judges to the court of final instance of the ordinary courts is solved in Norway 
and Poland. The objects of comparison are institutions with comparable roles in judicial 
selection according to constitutional and statutory provisions. This means that the focus will be 
the branches of government and the composition, selection and influence of bodies with similar 
functions in selection of appointees. The latter requires looking at the Norwegian Judicial 
Appointments Board, to some extent the Norwegian Courts Administration and the Polish 
National Council of the Judiciary, whose role functionally overlap the two Norwegian bodies 
in certain areas. Furthermore, the functional analysis must examine the extent of the executive 
discretion vis-à-vis the external bodies.  
A purely functional approach certainly has its limitations. Rules that on surface-level appear 
similar may have quite different functions, which is why comparative law increasingly 
recognises the significance of legal culture as a context.29 A legal cultural approach recognises 
that a legal system and its laws does not operate in a vacuum, but that external “socio-historical, 
sociological, cultural and historical frameworks” influence reception of law.30 I will therefore 
complement the analysis with a legal cultural perspective, which requires identifying and 
comparing functionally equivalent cultural criteria.31 Sunde describes legal culture as “ideas of 
and expectations to law made operational by institutional(-like) practices”.32 His model (LCM) 
differentiates between a legal culture’s institutional structure (conflict resolution and norm 
production) and intellectual structure (ideals of justice, legal method, degree of 
professionalisation and character of internationalisation), and thus allows comparison of 
equivalent elements of legal culture.33 My intention is to apply the factors that researchers has 
 
27 See Koch (2020) p. 48 ff with further references; Zweigert and Kötz (1998).  
28 Zweigert and Kötz (1998) chapter A no. 3.  
29 In this direction Nelken (2014); Husa (2018); Koch (2020); Sunde (2020).  
30 See also Husa (2018). 
31 See Koch (2020) p. 51. 
32 Sunde (2020) p. 27. 
33 Ibid. p. 38. 
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identified as crucial to the Polish crisis to the LCM, with the objective of better understanding 
the interplay between judicial selection mechanisms and legal cultural context in order to assess 
whether proposed changes to the Norwegian procedure is necessary and sufficient.  
1.3.2. European Framework  
Both Norway and Poland have obligations to supranational bodies and international 
instruments. Especially important in this regard is the right to independent courts enshrined in 
article 6 ECHR and article 47 in the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Additionally, there are 
several soft law legal instruments that have influenced European countries. For the purpose of 
this research, a brief account of the obligations to the ECHR, the EU and recommendations by 
the Council of Europe will have to suffice.  
Norway and Poland have ratified the ECHR, 34 which makes it binding on the same level as 
national statutes. The right to an “independent (…) tribunal” is codified in article 6, and 
according to case law by the ECtHR, a tribunal’s independence depend partly on "the manner 
of appointment of its members”.35 Assessment of the “existence of procedural safeguards” is 
done on a case-by-case basis, as the court is reluctant to prescribe any “theoretical constitutional 
concepts regarding the permissible limits of the powers’ interaction”.36 Generally, the court 
finds it acceptable that the executive has authority over selection of judges provided that 
“appointees are free from influence or pressure when carrying out their adjudicatory role”.37 
Furthermore, European Union law is relevant for both countries. The EU requires its members 
to ensure judicial independence,38 but rather than prescribe standards it applies an appearance 
of independence-test.39 This is binding on Poland, as the principles of direct applicability and 
primacy of EU-law has been codified in the Polish Constitution.40 Norway is a signatory to the 
 
34 See the Human Rights Act section 2 and Art. 9 of the Polish Constitution, respectively. 
35 Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá v. Portugal [GC] 2018, nos. 55391/13, 57728/13 and 74041/13 para. 
144. 
36 Kleyn and Others v. the Netherlands [GC] 2003, nos. 39343/98, 39651/98, 43147/98 and 46664/99 para. 193. 
37 Flux v. Moldova (no. 2) [J] 2007, no. 31001/03 para. 27. 
38 Article 19 TEU and Article 47 of the EU-charter; Judgment C-216/18 PPU para. 66. 
39 A.K. and Others v. Sąd Najwyższy [GC] C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18. 
40 Art. 91 paras. 1, 2 and 3 of the Norwegian Constitution.  
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EEA-agreement, 41 which does not include article 19 TEU or the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights Article 47.42  
Both Norway and Poland are members of the Council of Europe.43 It recommends primarily 
that an independent authority, half of which consisting of “judges chosen by their peers”, 
appoints judges.44 When appointments are conferred on the executive branch, an independent 
body (preferably a judicial council) comprised “in substantial part” from the judiciary should 
make recommendations that the executive in practice ought to follow.45 The European 
Commission for Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission), an advisory body on 
constitutional matters for the Council of Europe, has developed guidelines for judicial 
appointments.46 Although its opinions have no legally binding force, they are commonly 
followed and referred to by various European institutions.47 The VC recommends conferring 
“decisive influence” of appointments on the independent judicial council,48 because this will 
insulate the judiciary from undue pressure from the executive and legislative branches.49 The 
judicial council’s composition should be pluralistic with “a substantial part, if not the majority, 
of members being judges”.50 The discussion of both the Norwegian and the Polish appointment 
procedure will therefore have to be examined in light of obligations and expectations from these 
organisations and institutions.  
1.3.3. Sources of Norwegian law  
Relevant sources for this thesis are the Norwegian Constitution, ordinary statutes including 
incorporated international law (lover),51 preparatory works (forarbeider), administrative 
practice (andre myndigheters praksis), soft law recommendations, literature by legal science 
 
41 The EEA Agreement Art. 1 (2), 3 and 7, cf. the EEA Act. 
42 Bårdsen (2015) para. 21.  
43 List of members available at: <https://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/47-members-states> accessed 25 November 
2020.  
44 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010), Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 para. 46. 
45 Ibid. para. 47. 
46 European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2010), Report CDL-
AD(2010)004-e; Ibid. (2007), Report CDL-AD(2007)028-e. 
47 Helgesen (2014) p. 107. 
48 European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2007), Report CDL-
AD(2007)028-e para. 49. 
49 Ibid. (1999), Opinion CDL-INF(1999)005-e para. 28.  
50 Ibid. (2010), Report CDL-AD(2010)004-e para. 32. 
51 Art. 76-79 of the Norwegian Constitution.  
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and considerations or value-based assessments (reelle hensyn).52 Case law by the Supreme 
Court (høyesterettsrettspraksis) is a source of significant weight,53 but I did not come across 
any Supreme Court cases directly relevant for judicial appointments.  
A general principle of Norwegian legal method is that sources are not formally ranked 
hierarchically but balanced against one another and weighted following certain principles of 
weight.54 However, the Constitution and Acts of Parliament are natural starting points due to 
their democratic legitimacy. Furthermore, written norms such as the Constitution, statutes and 
administrative regulations internally follow rules of competence.55 In this hierarchy, the 
Norwegian Constitution is lex superior to other sources. Both constitutional provisions and 
ordinary statutes are often fragmentary and formulated in short and abstract terms, with details 
concerning organisation commonly addressed in administrative regulations.56 Statutes are also 
complemented by preparatory works, intended to have approximately the same function as 
commentaries on legislation in other European countries.57 These documents contain 
discussions and explanations by expert commissions and representatives from ministries and 
Parliamentary committees, and therefore have a certain degree of democratic legitimacy.58 This 
research will therefore extensively reference preparatory works when discussing current and 
proposed legislation. Administrative practice, legal science and important considerations will 
also be referenced where applicable. Their weight as legal argument bases depend on how 
convincing they are balanced against other sources, which usually limit their role to supporting 
arguments and interpretative factors.59 
1.3.4. Sources of Polish law 
The functional comparative approach requires application of legal sources that are comparable 
in function.60 Poland have certain categories of relevant argument bases that resemble that of 
Norway. These are defined in the Polish Constitution’s third chapter, which provides that the 
 
52 For an overview over legal argument bases, see Kjølstad, Koch and Sunde (2020) pp. 126-135; Helland and 
Koch (2014) p. 120 ff. 
53 No principle of stare desisis exists, but precedent has a great deal of weight. See Kjølstad, Koch and Sunde 
(2020) pp. 119-121 with further references. 
54 Ibid. pp. 126-135; Helland and Koch (2014) p. 108 ff. 
55 See Helland and Koch (2014) p. 108 ff; Kjølstad, Koch and Sunde (2020) p. 131-132 with further references.  
56 Kjølstad, Koch and Sunde (2020) p. 118. 
57 Ibid.; Schei p. 10 ff.  
58 Helland and Koch (2014) pp. 121-123.  
59 Ibid. pp. 125-127. 
60 For a comparative approach to legal method, see Henninger (2014).  
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Constitution, statutes, ratified international agreements and regulations are relevant sources of 
law.61 It is therefore mainly law as set by the legislator that is considered binding, and the 
internal ranking resembles the Norwegian.62 The application of sources has legal positivism as 
the guiding principle,63 implying that formal law is intended to be interpreted using grammatical 
interpretation. Case law is not a formally binding source,64 but will be referenced to illustrate 
that the Supreme Court has expressed an opinion. Unlike Norwegian law, the use of preparatory 
works in interpretation of legislation is uncommon in Poland.65 It is more common for courts 
to reference opinions of legal scholars and I therefore consider it appropriate to rely on the 
interpretation by Polish scholars where applicable. 
Naturally, a large portion of legal sources on Polish law is in Polish. This language barrier will 
be dealt with using English versions of documents published by the Polish institutions where 
available. Where references are made to the Polish Constitution, the official English version 
published by Parliament have been used. A portion of the study requires looking at amendments 
to relevant Polish statutes, which is not available in official translations. In these cases, 
unofficial translations by the Venice Commission will have to suffice. Furthermore, there will 
be an extensive use of secondary sources by legal scholars. I find this approach acceptable 
because Polish statutory regulation of judicial appointments is used as a subject of comparison 
to shed light on the resilience of particular regulations and not examined on equal footing with 





61 Art. 87 para. 1 of the Polish Constitution. 
62 The Constitution is the supreme source of law, cf. Article 8 no. 1. See Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and 
Koch (2020) chapter 3.  
63 See Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and Koch (2020) chapter 4 and pp. 300-301.   
64 Ibid. p. 291, p. 302.  
65 Ibid. pp. 302-303.  
14 
 
2. The Norwegian appointment 
procedure 
2.1. Introduction 
The topic of this thesis is appointment of judges to the Norwegian Supreme Court (Høyesterett), 
the court of final instance in a three-tier single hierarchy to safeguard judicial independence.66 
This requires a presentation of the current selection mechanism, focusing on the involvement 
of the government branches and external bodies in the selection of candidates and formal 
appointment. The earlier stages of recruitment, such as advertising vacant positions, finding 
qualified applicants and interviews, is beyond its scope.  
Until recently, the Constitution did not contain an explicit provision on the independence of the 
judiciary, although the principle clearly existed in Norwegian constitutional law.67 A 2014-
amendment marking the 200th anniversary of the Constitution introduced a chapter on human 
rights that include provisions on the independence of judges.68 A key provision is Article 95, 
which in first paragraph provides that everyone has the right to have their case heard by an 
independent and impartial court (“en uavhengig og upartisk domstol”). The term “independent” 
is meant to have the same requirements as article 6 and must therefore be interpreted in light of 
ECtHR case law.69 Furthermore, article 95 holds the state responsible for securing the 
independence of courts.70  
This chapter will present the current legislative provisions regarding judicial appointments, 
hereunder the roles and influence of the King in Council, the Judicial Appointments Board and 
its relation to the Norwegian Court Administration. Important aspects are limitations on the 
executive’s discretion, composition of the board and selection of its members. The main 
objections to the current system will then be presented, before I address the most relevant 
suggestions in the latest report. 
 
66 The Courts of Justice Act section 1. For an overview of the Norwegian court system, see Aarli and Arntzen 
(2021). 
67 Innst. 186 S (2013–2014) p. 24. 
68 Chapter D of the Constitution. 
69 Dok.nr.16 (2011-2012) p. 122; Case Rt. 2014 p. 1292 para. 21. 
70 Rt. 2014 p. 1292 para. 21; see also Art. 95 para. 2; Art. 92; Innst. 186 S (2013–2014) p. 24. 
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2.2. Current law 
2.2.1. Constitutional provisions 
The legal basis for the procedure for appointments is partly found in the Constitution, partly in 
other statutes and partly in practice. In the Constitution, Article 21 states that the power to 
choose and appoint “all senior and military officials” (including judges71) is conferred on “[t]he 
King … after consultation with his Council of State”. Because Norway is a constitutional 
monarchy, the King (Kongen) is referenced in relation to executive power.72 When Article 21 
requires the King to sit with “his Council of State”, this points to the council consisting of the 
Prime Minister and at least seven government members.73 Even though the appointment 
authority secured in article 21 is considered a prerogative of the King,74 the fact that the 
appointment occurs “after consultation” with the council indicates that the Monarch routinely 
appoints the candidates selected by the Government. The appointed judge can then hold the 
position until reaching the statutory age limit of 70.75  
The Constitution therefore confer formal appointment authority on the executive branch, 
without involvement of Parliament. From a separation of powers point of view, the fact that the 
executive has influence on who is performing checks on it could be considered problematic. 
There are also problematic aspects concerning political influence on the judge after 
appointment. The question to be discussed going forward is thus whether Article 21 provides 
the King in Council full discretion over judicial appointments or whether this power is subject 
to restrictions by other branches or bodies.  
2.2.2. Provisions of the Courts of Justice Act 
Ordinary Supreme Court judges 
Under the Courts of Justice Act section 55, Supreme Court judges are appointed according to 
Article 21 in the Constitution (i.e. by the King in Council). The preparatory works emphasise 
that appointments are the constitutional responsibility of the King in Council, who is expected 
 
71 Judges are senior civil servants, see section 1 para. 2 of the Civil Service Act; NOU 1999: 19 p. 172. 
72 See Art. 3 of the Constitution. 
73 Ibid. Art. 12. 
74 NOU 1999: 19 p. 229.   
75 Art. 22 para. 3 of the Constitution; cf. Act Relating to Age Limits for Civil Servants and Others section 2. 
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to assess the candidates.76 As a result of a reform in 2002, the appointment procedure requires 
the influence of an independent body dedicated to the appointment of judges.77 According to 
sections 55 a and 55 b, the Judicial Appointments Board (JAB) gives an “innstilling” 
concerning appointments, to be collected by the King in Council prior to appointment. The term 
“innstilling” in sections 55 a and 55 b could be understood as a formal nomination, proposition 
or recommendation. As the phrase “recommendation” is used in the English summary in the 
preparatory works,78 it will also be applied here. It is meant to have its own specific meaning 
in the context of judicial appointments that differs from related legislation.79 The JAB is 
intended to be a new, strong, external body that limits executive powers and provides for a 
broader and more transparent assessment of applicants.80 It is authorised to present the King in 
Council with three candidates and an explanation of the choices, sorted in order of priority.81   
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
The Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is asked to give a written or oral statement on judicial 
appointments directly to the ministry after the Board’s recommendation is received,82 which 
gives the judiciary influence on the decision. The appointment procedure described in statute 
does not apply to appointment of Chief Justice, who is appointed by the King in Council 
according to practice.83 In the preparatory works it was considered desirable with a more active 
involvement of the democratically elected executive branch due to the ‘special character’ of the 
position.84 Involvement of Parliament was considered common and there was no discussion 
whether this was problematic. Consequently, the head of the Supreme Court is subject to a 
certain risk of political influence. When the Chief Justice expresses opinions on candidates to 
the Ministry, a potential for political bias is not limited to the Chief Justice alone. Furthermore, 
it could be problematic that the procedures of a position with such ‘special character’ is largely 
based on practice and not secured in legislation. 
 
76 NOU 1999: 19 p. 188. 
77 See Amendments to the Act Relating to the Courts of Justice etc. 
78 NOU 1999: 19 p. 565. 
79 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 189. 
80 NOU 1999: 19 p. 194. 
81 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 b para. 3.  
82 Court of Justice Act section 55 para. 4. 
83 Ibid. section 55 b para. 7 states that the section does not apply to appointments of Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court. See also Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 149.  
84 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 105. However, Parliament is reluctant to get involved, see Thommessen (2016).  
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2.2.3. The Norwegian Courts Administration 
The appointment procedure confers responsibility for judicial appointments and administrative 
tasks on different bodies. In the 2002-reform, managerial operations were moved from the 
Ministry of Justice to the newly established Norwegian Courts Administration (NCA).85 The 
justification was a desire for clearer separation between the courts and ministry to increase 
judicial independence and minimise the risk of undue politicization.86 Chapter 1A of the Courts 
of Justice Act presumes that the NCA has secretarial functions for the JAB, including 
budgeting, but no authority to instruct the Board.  
In addition, the NCA is involved in the initial phase of the appointment procedure,87 has a 
superior employer function and has an active role in promotion of public confidence.88 The 
democratic legitimacy of the NCA is maintained through guidelines in the draft budget and 
government instructions by Royal Decree.89 Consequently, appointments and administrative 
tasks are separated between two different bodies. The details of their roles vis-à-vis each other 
appear complex and unclear in certain areas, 90 but the details concerning this interaction is 
beyond the subject of this research.  
2.2.4. Is the King in Council bound by the recommendation? 
The Constitution clearly provides the King in Council formal authority over appointments, 
whilst the Courts of Justice Act requires that a recommendation is obtained prior to 
appointment.91 The question is to what degree the executive is bound to follow these 
recommendations once received. Section 55 c requires the King in Council to ask the JAB for 
an assessment or statement (“uttalelse”) of any applicant it considers appointing if that applicant 
has not been recommended by the board (“søker som ikke er innstilt”). None of these provisions 
explicitly state that the King in Council is legally bound to follow the recommendation, and the 
option to deviate from the recommendation seems to imply the opposite.  
 
85 See the Courts of Justice Act Chapter 1A. 
86 Rosseland (2007); Schei (2014) pp. 15-16. 
87 Innstillingsrådet for dommere (2020) p. 39.  
88 Description available at: <www.domstol.no/en/Norwegian-Courts-Administration/> accessed 24 November 
2020. 
89 Rosseland (2007) pp. 610-611.  
90 NOU 2020: 11 pp. 108-109. 
91 The Courts of Justice Act Section 55 b para. 1. 
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According to preparatory works, the Ministry of Justice is expected to perform a review of the 
recommended applicants, in which the recommendations “carry a great deal of weight”.92 It 
was believed that the balance between democratic legitimacy and judicial independence was 
best achieved by giving the King in Council discretion to choose freely amongst the 
recommendations and an opportunity to appoint someone else entirely if the JAB could review 
the candidate first. This is based on the principle that the executive is parliamentary and 
constitutionally accountable for appointments.93 Importantly, it is emphasised that increased 
external influence does not in practice constitute a legal restriction of the constitutional 
prerogative of the executive.94 There also seems to be consensus among legal scholars that the 
recommendations are non-binding and that parliamentary responsibility require freedom of 
choice.95 
It is, however, assumed that the King in Council usually appoints the highest ranked 
recommended candidate. The recommendation has been followed for the past 10 years,96 and 
the option to ask that someone other than the recommended candidates be assessed has not been 
used.97 A deviation from the recommended order of priority has occurred in only 9 cases.98 It 
is worth noting that the JAB has never been offered a justification,99 and it could therefore be 
argued that the process lacks transparency and grounds for verification. Interviews suggest a 
reduction in meetings and dialogue between the Ministry and JAB the last couple of years due 
to changing national and international attitudes towards the judicial independence.100 But it is 
clear from legislation, preparatory works and legal literature that previous practice does not 
bind the executive in future appointments. An option to directly influence the work of the JAB 
through administrative regulations exists,101 but has not yet been used.102  
 
 
92 NOU 1999: 19 at 15.6. The Norwegian term is “meget stor vekt” (at 7.5.3.3).  
93 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 188. 
94 NOU 1999:19 at 7.5.5; Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 103 ff.  
95 Smith (2017c) p. 267; Fliflet (2014) p. 69; Bøhn (2013); interpretation by Oslo District Court (TOSLO-2010-
7432).  
96 Direktoratet for forvaltning og økonomistyring (2020) p. 22.  
97 Innstillingsrådet for dommere (2020) p. 5; Schei (2011). 
98 Innstillingsrådet for dommere (2020) p. 59.  
99 Ibid. p. 59, assuming that in 7 out of 9 cases, the justification was gender-based quotas. 
100 Direktoratet for forvaltning og økonomistyring (2020) p. 23; NOU 2020: 11 p. 122, recommending it be 
revoked. 
101 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 b para. 6. 
102 Innstillingsrådet for dommere (2020) p. 4.  
19 
 
2.2.5. The Judicial Appointments Board 
Composition 
Where a separate judicial board recommends appointees to the executive, the composition of 
that board has implications for to which degree it promotes the independence of the judicial 
branch. The Judicial Appointments Board is comprised of three judges from the ordinary courts, 
an advocate,103 a legal professional/lawyer from the public service104 and two non-lawyers/lay 
members.105 The Equality and Anti-Discrimination Act provides that the Board maintain gender 
balance.106 As the provisions indicate, the Board consists predominantly of members with legal 
background. However, having both private and public sector and two non-lawyers represented 
ensure a broader range of competency.107 The text does not specify whether all three tiers of the 
court hierarchy must be represented, but preparatory works imply that selection of members is 
based on qualification alone, regardless of tier.108 At present, the first two tiers are 
represented.109 The two lay members represent the general public and function as 
counterweights to the judges and other legal professions, and the only requirement is that the 
person does not have legal training or background.  
The Council of Europe recommends that its members should be “drawn in substantial part from 
the judiciary”.110 The required ratio for an amount to be “substantial” is not defined in the 
recommendation, but it is presumably less than 50% due to the explicit recommendation of 50 
% representation for members of a Judicial Council.111 According to ECtHR case law 
concerning judicial councils with disciplinary powers, three out of sixteen112 (18,8 %) and eight 
out of eighteen113 (44,5 %) suggested lack of independence. Considered in isolation, the ratio 
in these cases could indicate that having three out of seven members (42,9 %) to represent the 
judiciary is problematic according to the ECHR. However, the case law refers to councils with 
 
103 An “advokat” is a person authorised by the Supervisory Council for Legal Practice to practice law in Norway. 
104 A “jurist” is a person with a master’s degree in law.  
105 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 a para. 1 second sentence. 
106 Section 28.  
107 NOU 1999: 19 at 7.5.3.1.1. 
108 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 189. 
109 Description available in Norwegian at their website: <https://www.domstol.no/innstillingsradet/om-
innstillingsradet/innstillingsradets-medlemmer/> accessed 24 November 2020. 
110 See The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010); Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 paras. 
46 and 47; CDL-AD(2010)004-e. 
111 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010); Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 para. 46. 
112 Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine [J] 2013, no. 21722/11. 
113 Denisov v. Ukraine [GC] 2018, no. 76639/11 para. 70. 
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disciplinary functions, which the JAB does not have.114 It is therefore unclear to which degree 
the mentioned standards are applied equally to a body without such functions.  
Selection of members 
The manner in which members of judicial councils or boards are chosen has also been 
considered relevant for judicial independence by the ECtHR.115 Consequently, it matters 
whether the judiciary participates in selecting members or it is conferred on political bodies. 
The phrase “chosen by their peers” is often used in reference to judicial councils with wider 
authorities than only appointments,116 but does not expressly limit its application so as to 
exclude a board that primarily recommends appointees. When the point of such bodies is to 
reduce executive dominance, allowing the executive branch to choose judicial members freely 
would make such a reduction illusory.  
Members of the JAB are appointed by the King in Council for a term of four years,117 and the 
Ministry of Justice clearly wanted the head of state to have full discretion in this matter. 
Although it is assumed that the NCA is consulted prior to appointment and that courts and the 
Norwegian Association of Judges can suggest members, the King can ultimately choose 
freely.118 The potential of political influence that is emphasised in case law of the ECtHR 
regarding such arrangements is undoubtedly present in the Norwegian system.119 Selection of 
members allows political influence indirectly through the King in Council’s choice of 
members, potentially risking the function the JAB has been given to promote judicial 
independence.  
2.3. Debate preceding the 2020-report  
Politicians and legal scholars have argued both for increasing and decreasing involvement by 
the legislature or the executive in appointments. A common argument against involvement of 
 
114 Judges are reported to the Supervisory Committee for Judges (Tilsynsutvalget for dommere), cf. the Courts of 
Justice Act section 236 para. 1.  
115 See Oleksandr Volkov v. Ukraine [J] 2013, no. 21722/11 para. 112. 
116 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010) Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12 para. 46 
refers to such councils, whereas para. 47 discuss a Norwegian form of model. 
117 Courts of Justice Act section 55 a para. 2.  
118 Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) p. 102. Note that the Board of the Courts Administration is also predominantly 
selected by the King in Council. 
119 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (2010) para. 109 ff.  
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Parliament is politicization, perhaps because the process arguably already allows for undue 
political involvement.120 An appointment based on political views could make the appointed 
feel a sense of obligation in return for the appointment.121 The same arguments have been used 
to criticize the authority of the King in Council. In a recent note to the Court Commission, the 
Norwegian Association of Judges calls for establishing an independent judicial council 
comprised predominantly of judges.122 Such suggestions often reference Norway’s 
international obligations, which notably often have a primary objective of maximising judicial 
independence. 
The other end of the spectrum is characterised by general scepticism towards increasing judicial 
influence. Some have argued that the appointment process is not democratic enough and 
insisted on strengthening the involvement of the Parliament (Stortinget). A recent bill suggests 
requiring a two-thirds majority of votes in the Storting prior to appointment of Supreme Court 
judges.123 However, this could suggest that judicial appointments are partisan.124 It has been 
argued that the ratio of judicial representatives on the JAB is problematic due to the Supreme 
Court’s involvement with constitutional matters and political questions, and that judges of a 
court actively involved in the development of law should not be appointed by the judiciary 
itself.125 This relates to the question of democratic legitimacy, lack of which is feared to result 
in self-recruitment and a ‘state within a state’.126  
Concerns has also been expressed regarding appointments of Chief Justice of the Supreme 
Court, including by the Ombudsman.127 By not including the JAB or a similar, independent 
body, the selection mechanism fails to comply with international recommendations. Arguably, 
the problematic nature of providing the Government full discretion is even worse when 
considering the lack of transparency surrounding the position.128 Eventually, the public debates 
demonstrate that the issue has renewed relevance. It also shows an apparent lack of consensus 
amongst Norwegian legal scholars on how judicial independence and democratic legitimacy 
should be balanced.  
 
120 Holmøyvik and Kierulf (2016); Schmidt (2018); Kolsrud (2018). 
121 See Fliflet (2016). 
122 Den norske dommerforening (2020). 
123 Dokument 12:3 (2019-2020).  
124 See NOU 2020: 11 p. 125.  
125 Smith (2017a) p. 23 ff. 
126 NOU 1999: 19 at 7.5.2.   




2.4. The Court Commission’s recommendations 
2.4.1. Introduction 
The Commission’s report does not involve any radical changes to current law, but mainly 
subtle changes aimed at strengthening judicial independence. In the following, I will present 
the recommended changes as concerns the King in Council’s discretion, the composition and 
selection of the JAB and appointment of Chief Justice, and discuss suggested changes 
compared to current law in light of judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. 
2.4.2. The discretion of the King in Council 
Unsurprisingly, the Commission does not recommend revoking the King in Council’s 
appointment authority.129 Instead, the report suggests codifying the requirement for a 
recommendation from an independent Board in chapter D of the Constitution.130 The proposed 
text, roughly translated, requires that “judges are appointed by the King after recommendation 
from an independent council/board”.131 Consequently, any appointment that fails to follow this 
procedure would be unconstitutional. The existing practice would therefore have constitutional 
protection that signals limitations to the executive’s discretion and reduces the ability to misuse 
appointment power. The provision would also have to be interpreted in a way that is compatible 
with Article 95 and the requirement for judicial independence would make any instructions 
from the other state branches unconstitutional. 
Other changes to ordinary legislation were proposed that would formally reduce executive 
discretion and therefore political influence. The King in Council is not allowed to deviate from 
the Board’s recommendation, but has the option to reject it once.132 This would require revoking 
the current option to choose a different candidate.133 The option to diverge from the ranking 
keeps the prerogative from appearing hollowed out. A decision not to appoint the highest ranked 
candidate requires that the Board be notified and that a public justification is provided. 
Increased transparency is meant to provide democratic control with judicial appointments. 
 
129 NOU 2020: 11 pp. 125-126. 
130 Ibid. p. 227. 
131 Ibid. p. 354, suggested as Art. 90 para. 1 in the Constitution. 
132 Ibid. p. 114, suggested as section 55 c of the Courts of Justice Act.  
133 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 c. 
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Compared to current law, the suggestion tilts the balance towards increased judicial 
independence by reducing the executive’s choices in practice.  
2.4.3. The Judicial Appointments Board 
Another suggested change is increasing the Judicial Appointments Board from seven members 
to eleven, of which ten participate in the selection of appointment to the Supreme Court.134 The 
members consist of three judges from ordinary courts and a land consolidation judge, two 
lawyers, a legal professional from public service and three lay-members. The number of judges 
would therefore increase slightly, but the ratio in total would be lowered. Whilst acknowledging 
international recommendations, the largest fraction of the Commission believed that a board 
with a judicial majority would lack sufficient democratic legitimacy.135 The power Norwegian 
judges have to adjudicate on constitutional matters demand democratic control, and it was 
feared that public confidence could be weakened by increased judicial self-regulation.136 When 
the discretion of the King in Council is suggested decreased compared to current formal law, 
ensuring that judges are not in a majority on the Board could be a fair compromise between 
independence and legitimacy.  
Allowing the executive branch an exclusive right to choose members of the Board could be 
problematic for judicial independence. The Commission recommends that the King in Council 
continues to select members, but there are some alterations.137 The NCA would select the 
judicial members, and at least one of the lawyers will be chosen by the Norwegian Bar 
Association (Advokatforeningen).138 This reduces direct executive influence in favour of the 
judiciary compared to current law, although the NCA’s board members are still predominantly 
chosen by the executive branch. Influence by political branches is therefore still prevalent.  
2.4.4. Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
A very clear change compared to current law involves the appointment of Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. The exclusive authority that the current mechanism confers on the executive, 
and potentially Parliament, undoubtedly allows for political influence on a very important 
 
134 NOU 2020: 11 p. 126. 
135 Ibid. p. 119.  
136 Ibid. p. 95. 
137 Ibid. pp. 125-126. 
138 Ibid. p. 115.  
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position and fails to comply with international standards. The Commission did not believe 
Parliament should be formally involved, but instead recommended the establishment of an ad 
hoc council. 139 It would be composed of three members, chosen by the Ministry of Justice, the 
JAB and Norwegian Bar Association, respectively. Democratic legitimacy would be 
maintained as formal appointment is still conferred on the King in Council.  
Codification of procedures for appointment of Chief Justice would strengthen the democratic 
legitimacy and transparency of the process.140 The recommendation also reduces the exclusive 
authority that the executive branch has, especially considering that the ad hoc council is not 
exclusively or mostly selected by the executive. However, the suggested provision does not 
specify whether the recommendation formally binds the King in Council. 141 The explicit option 
to reject the recommendation once in ordinary appointments (section 55 c) could suggest it does 
not apply to the position of Chief Justice. On the other hand, the Commission’s statement that 
the rules regulating the ad hoc council would follow the ordinary procedure of appointments as 
far as possible could suggest an analogical interpretation of section 55 c.142 The answer is not 
clear, and perhaps not that practical given the ministry’s participation in selecting the council.  
2.5. Summary 
The current discretion provided for the King in Council allows for some political influence on 
judicial appointments, both in the appointment itself and through selection of members to the 
JAB. The proposed changes formally shift the balance of power slightly away from the 
executive,143 but mostly involve clarification and codification of existing norms and practices. 
The report also gives the impression that the state of judicial independence in Norway is good 
and that the 2002-reform has yielded the desired results, in line with general consensus.144  
However, it is worth remembering that this does not justify relying on the status quo to remain 
unaffected, and the courts need to be resilient against potential societal changes in the future. 
Despite long democratic traditions, Norway is certainly not immune to the rise in populist 
 
139 Ibid. pp. 127-130.  
140 See Sivilombudsmannen (2016). 
141 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 b para. 7; NOU 2020: 11 p. 357.  
142 NOU 2020: 11 p. 129. 
143 Ibid. pp. 352-353. Amendments include codification of the court hierarchy, maximum number of Supreme 
Court judges, requiring the state to ensure independent administration, and revoking section 55 b para. 6 on 
administrative regulations.  
144 NOU 2020: 11; Aarli and Arntzen (2021) p. 73; Fliflet (2014) p. 71. 
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sentiment around the world. Additionally, there might be some correlation between the 
Government that has appointed a judge and the appointed judge’s tendency to vote in favour of 
the state.145 A close link between executive and judicial branches thus have practical 
implications even in times of political stability. 
Before further evaluations of the proposed changes, I wish to look at the ongoing constitutional 
crisis in Poland by discussing its effect on selection of judges. The objective is to grasp the 
effectiveness and resilience of constitutional as well as legal protection of judicial independence 
towards political attacks to better evaluate whether proposed amendments to the Norwegian 
selection mechanism are sufficient. 
 
145 See Grendstad, Shaffer and Waltenburg (2010); Shaffer, Grendstad and Waltenburg (2014); opposite: 
Føllesdal (2013); Schei (2011). 
26 
 
3. The Polish appointment procedure 
 
“As history demonstrates, a democracy without values 
easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.” 146 
 
Pope John Paul II speaking to the Polish Parliament in June 1999 about the 
new Constitution. 
3.1. Introduction 
It is often beneficial to look beyond one’s own legal system to gain new perspectives and 
insights. On the topic of judicial independence, Poland is particularly interesting at this point 
in history. Statutory amendments since 2015 has affected the independence of all tiers of the 
court system, resulting in what has been dubbed an “anti-constitutional populist backsliding”147 
and a “constitutional crisis”148, leaving Polish democracy as “illiberal with strong authoritarian 
overtones”.149 The Polish Supreme Court is comparable to the Norwegian, as it acts as the court 
of final instance in the ordinary courts.150 Poland has a Constitutional Tribunal separate from 
the judiciary, but for the purpose of comparison with the Norwegian Supreme Court the 
Supreme Court is a better parallel as only a limited portion of the Norwegian Supreme Court’s 
caseload concerns constitutional questions.  
The intention with this chapter is to add to the assessment of appointments to the Norwegian 
Supreme Court by using Polish selection mechanism only as a reference point. This leaves little 
room for detailed presentation of the Polish legal system or of all relevant legal sources on 
judicial independence and appointments, nor of all statutory changes between 2015 and 2020 
that affects judicial independence.151 The focus will be on a few main features of the 
appointment process, starting with an outline of the most important statutory provisions on 
 
146 John Paul II, Address to the Polish Parliament, 11 June 1999, available at  
<http://www.vatican.va/content/john-paul-ii/en/speeches/1999/june/documents/hf_jp-ii_spe_19990611_warsaw-
Parliament.html> accessed 4 December 2020. 
147 Sadurski (2019a) p. 14.  
148 Bodnar (2018). 
149 Bugarič and Ginsburg (2016) p. 71. 
150 Art. 175 of the Polish Constitution. 




appointment of Supreme Court judges. Then, I will present the composition of and selection to 
National Council of the Judiciary. 
3.2. Statutory provisions 
The appointment procedure is secured in the Polish Constitution. According to Article 179, 
judges of the Supreme Court (Sąd Najwyższy) are appointed by the President of the Republic. 
The President is the head of state of Poland,152 and the Constitution therefore confers decisive 
authority of judicial appointments on the executive branch. Prior to the appointment, the 
Constitution requires a motion from the National Council of the Judiciary (Krajowa Rada 
Sądownictwa, NCJ).153 The NCJ is explicitly tasked with safeguarding the independence of 
courts and judges,154 which includes the authority to examine, assess and submit requests for 
appointments to the President.155 The wording of article 179 leaves it open to which degree the 
President is bound to appoint the requested candidates.  
3.3. Is the President of the Republic bound by the 
recommendation?  
It seems to be a matter of controversy in Polish constitutional law whether the President can 
deviate from the suggested candidates.156 Until 2008, the executive had accepted the proposals 
that the 1997-Constitution provides for. When President Kaczyński that year refused to appoint 
the Council’s nominated candidates, he started what has been dubbed a “long judicial saga” 
regarding the President’s prerogative in appointments.157  
The question has been challenged in court, but without reaching any conclusions.158 Some legal 
scholars believe that the President lacks the power to reject proposals,159 whereas others claim 
that the nature of the prerogative provides discretion to reject candidates without justification.160 
If the latter is true, judicial appointments rests on the mercy of the executive branch and the 
 
152 Art. 126 of the Constitution.  
153 Ibid. Art. 179 and Art. 144 para. 3 subpara. 17. 
154 Ibid. Art. 186 para. 1. 
155 Art. 3 para. 1. of the Law on the NCJ. 
156 Sadurski (2019a) pp. 99-100.  
157 Ibid. p. 100; Bodnar and Bojarski (2012). 
158 See Constitutional Tribunal judgment SK 37/08; National Administrative Court judgment I OSK 1891/12. 
159 Zoll (2011) p. 303; Sadurski (2019a) p. 100. 
160 I understand Śledzińska-Simon (2018) p. 1844 in this direction.  
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constitutional role of the NCJ seem to be somewhat hollow. But as will be made evident, 
changes to the NCJ itself makes the prospect of a rejection less pressing.   
Another criticised amendment concerns lack of involvement of the judiciary in the appointment 
process. Prior to recent amendments, judges of the Supreme Court participated in the selection 
and assessment of candidates before the Council’s formal motion to the President,161 thus 
having substantial influence on the decision. The recent amendments mean that the Supreme 
Court is circumvented, as applications now go to the Council directly.162  
The highest position of the court, the First President, is also appointed by the executive branch, 
based on suggestions by the General Assembly of the Judges of the Supreme Court.163 The 
involvement of the Assembly on the surface seem to imply a certain degree of judicial influence. 
However, an amendment in 2017 increased number of candidates for the President to choose 
amongst from two to five, 164 increasing his influence vis-à-vis the judicial community.165 In 
practice, the likelihood of receiving a candidate sharing the President’s values has increased 
greatly as each judge holds one vote. The changes could appear to be a way to increase the 
President’s powers without having to change the Constitution. 
3.4. The National Council of the Judiciary 
3.4.1. Composition  
Another controversial reform raises concerns about politicisation of the National Council of the 
Judiciary. The council was established in 1989 and exist outside both the executive and the 
judiciary branches.166 In total, 15 of its 25 members are judges,167 which is in line with 
international recommendations. The remaining members are the First President, the Minister of 
Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court, an individual appointed by the 
President of the Republic and 6 members of Parliament. The composition is therefore aimed at 
distributing influence to all branches of government. All 15 judges are now replaced jointly at 
 
161 Filipek (2018). 
162 Ibid. p. 184. 
163 Art. 183 para. 3 of the Constitution.  
164 Art. 12 no. 1 of the New Law on the Supreme Court; European Commission For Democracy Through Law 
(Venice Commission) (2020), Joint Urgent Opinion CDL-AD(2020)017-e. 
165 Sadurski (2019a) p. 110. 
166 Bodnar and Bojarski (2012) p. 670.  
167 Art. 187 para. 1 of the Constitution. 
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the end of each four-year term,168 which arguably prompted an unconstitutional joint 
replacement of the sitting members in 2018.169 Although statutes require a broad range of 
professional representation, a widely boycotted 2018-election with only 18 applicants have left 
the Council with an overrepresentation of lower level courts.170  
3.4.2. Selection of members 
The selection of the judicial component of members is not explicitly regulated in the 
Constitution, but judges were traditionally elected by their peers and there seems to be 
consensus that this is implied by Article 187.171 An interpretation in light of other constitutional 
provisions seems to indicate the same,172 and this has also been accepted by the Constitutional 
Tribunal.173 A controversial bill was passed in 2017, providing that all fifteen judges are to be 
selected by the Sejm (lower chamber of Parliament) by a three-fifths majority.174 Candidates 
must be proposed by 2000 citizens or 25 judges, 175 which is the only remaining influence the 
judiciary has on selection of the Council’s judicial members. A total of 23 out of 25 members 
of the Council either belong to or is elected by political authorities.176 Consequently, the balance 
between the three branches has shifted in favour of political organs and total control over the 
NCJ now reside with the Parliamentary majority. The result seems to be that the candidates that 
the NCJ eventually request to be appointed have affiliations with the ruling party.177 This 
indicates that having a majority of a judicial council be judges is not a sufficient guarantee for 
judicial independence as long as the appointment is based on political grounds.  
3.5. Summary 
A series of amendments since 2015 has increased executive influence over judicial 
appointments, and the council tasked with safeguarding judicial independence has been subject 
 
168 Ibid. Art. 187 para. 3; Art. 9a of the Law on the NCJ. 
169 Sadurski (2019a) pp. 99-106. 
170 Filipek (2018) p. 180; Granat and Granat (2019).  
171 Ibid. p. 101, p. 254; Matczak (2020) at 5; Filipek (2018) p. 179; Granat and Granat (2019) p. 123 with further 
references; Zoll (2011); A.K. and Others v. Sąd Najwyższy [GC] C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18 para. 143. 
172 See Art. 187 section 1 (1) and (3), Art. 186 section 1 and Art. 10, cf. Matczak (2020) at 5; Filipek (2018) p. 
179.  
173 Filipek (2018) p. 179 points to the Judgment of 18 July 2007 (K 25/07) para. III 4 in note 11. 
174 Art. 9a of the 2017 Amending Law on the NCJ. 
175 Art. 11a (2) of the Law on the NCJ. 
176 A.K. and Others v. Sąd Najwyższy [GC] C-585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, para. 143. 
177 Filipek (2018) p. 189. 
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to amendments that ultimately proved damaging to the principle it was set to protect. It has been 
argued that recent amendments constitute a breach of the constitutional provisions that secures 
separation of powers and judicial independence.178 Article 10 provides for “the separation of 
and balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers”, whilst Article 173 states 
that “courts and tribunals shall constitute a separate power and shall be independent of other 
branches of power”. These articles give the judiciary both organisational and functional 
separation from the executive and legislature.179 Amendments such as enabling Parliament to 
select members to the NCJ instead of judges therefore challenge the principles that these 
provisions are intended to protect. And when checks on political power are removed, it becomes 
difficult to rightly claim that the status quo contains anything resembling the “separation”, 
“balance” and “independence” prescribed by the Polish Constitution.  
 
178 Ibid. p. 180; Matczak (2020). 
179 Judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal K 34/15. 
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4. The resilience of the Norwegian 
appointment procedure 
4.1. Introduction 
So far, I have presented procedures for appointment to the Norwegian and Polish Supreme 
courts separately. But the most interesting aspect of this research is assessing the Norwegian 
mechanism in light of one formally better equipped to ensure independence but nevertheless 
suffering from a constitutional crisis. 
Firstly, a functional comparative method will be used to explore how different appointment 
procedures may succeed or fail in ensuring formal judicial independence in Norway and Poland, 
focusing on the involvement of government branches and external bodies as regulated in 
Norwegian and Polish constitutional and statutory law. Secondly, I will use a legal cultural 
approach to explore the relationship between appointment procedure and some core values of 
importance to independence and public confidence in legal institutions and legal enforcement 
in the two countries. The analysis will hopefully provide valuable perspectives on whether 
statutory changes are needed in order to minimise the risk of a similar political attack on the 
judiciary in Norway as recently experienced in Poland.  
4.2. Assessing the proposed amendments through a 
functional comparative approach 
4.2.1. Formal appointments compared  
The recommendation in the 2020-report that the King in Council keeps decisive appointment 
authority means that both Norwegian and Polish procedures confer such authority on the same 
branch. In Poland, the constitutional requirement for motions by the NCJ is unclear regarding 
limitations on the President’s discretion, which has enabled interpretations that in practice make 
the motions optional to follow.  
The suggested new article 90 of the Norwegian Constitution has a similar formulation that 
leaves it open to interpretation. This would be clarified in the suggested new section in the 
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Courts of Justice Act providing the option to reject the recommendation,180 whereas I have 
found no such modification in Polish legislation. However, the frequency of recent Polish 
amendments suggests that supplementary statutes would provide little protection in any system 
in political crisis. The fact that the President has blatantly rejected proposals from the NCJ 
without consequences demonstrate e.g. a widely different view of the prerogative than the 
Norwegian King in Council. The Commission found the use of ordinary statutes sufficient until 
the new rules have had a chance to work in practice,181 but the suggested requirement for a 
public explanation for rejecting the recommendation increases transparency and raises the 
threshold to do so in the first place, at least until the statute is changed.  
Formally, both constitutionally provided prerogatives are modified by the requirement for a 
recommendation from an external body. The suggested changes in ordinary statute reduces the 
discretion of the King in Council compared to the powers that the Polish President has in 
practice given himself, making the Norwegian procedure perhaps slightly better equipped to 
secure judicial independence. The Norwegian judiciary is also to a larger extent involved 
through the Chief Justice’s written or oral statement to the ministry after the Board’s 
recommendation is received. 
4.2.2. Comparing the new Judicial Appointments Board to the 
“neo-NCJ”182 
Organisation of judicial governance varies greatly throughout Europe, depending on the chosen 
balance between judicial independence and democratic legitimacy. In a 2014 study, Bobek and 
Kosař classifies five models based on the organisation of administrative tasks and judicial 
appointments.183 According to the authors, Poland adopted a judicial council model, namely a 
“separate institution for judicial governance that has at least certain powers – even if limited – 
over the careers of judges.”184  
The Norwegian system was classified as a courts service model, in which an independent 
organization handles administration whilst another separate body manage judicial 
 
180 Ibid. p. 114, p. 357. 
181 NOU 2020: 11 p. 221. 
182 Phrase used by the Polish legal community to separate the post-2017 NCJ from the previous. See Gajda-
Roszczynialska and Markiewicz (2020). 
183 Bobek and Kosař (2014); and Kosař (2018) p. 1585 adding some nuance to this simplification.  
184 Bobek and Kosař (2014) p. 1266. 
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appointments.185 Although such categorisation to some degree simplifies complex systems, it 
helps highlight how these legal systems administrate judicial tasks differently and that the 
Polish NCJ formally encompasses more powers in one single body.186 When tasks are separated 
between several bodies it helps prevent any single one from becoming too dominant and 
requires more effort to seize control. Given the current reach of the Polish President’s 
appointment powers, it could be argued that the independence of the NCJ has become 
illusory.187  
With 15 out of 25 members, the NCJ has a higher ratio of judge-members than the suggested 4 
out of 10 by the Norwegian Court Commission. In theory, the composition of the Polish council 
is supposed to be better equipped to secure an independent judiciary. Having judges in a 
minority on the board, even decreasing the ratio compared to current law, is an intended choice 
by the Commission based on Norwegian Parliamentary traditions and emphasis on democratic 
legitimacy. The Polish model of judicial appointments does not seem to emphasise 
Parliamentary considerations to the same degree in this regard. Instead, the ratio of judges 
follows European recommendations’ emphasis on number of judges as a key factor for securing 
their independence. The ratio of judicial members of the NCJ has nevertheless proven less 
important as a safeguard against illiberal developments.   
The former Polish practice of involving the judicial community in the selection of judge-
members gave the judiciary a voice in appointments. Now that Parliament has full authority to 
choose these members, the NCJ has effectively been brought under the influence of the 
Parliamentary majority. The conditions for securing an independent judiciary have therefore 
changed for the worse. When the proposed amendments in Norway goes in the other direction, 
namely providing that the judicial members are chosen by the NCA, this constitutes a formal 
improvement that better secures an independent judiciary than current Polish law. Involving the 
executive branch, judicial community and lay participants provides broader range of influence. 
The ratio also considers the JAB’s increased formal influence over appointments vis-à-vis the 
executive branch.  
 
185 Ibid.  
186 Art. 3 of the Law on the NCJ. 
187 Castillo-Ortiz (2019) pp. 503-520, calling the current model a “pseudo-courts service model”.  
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4.2.3. Suggested changes to appointment of Supreme Court 
president 
One of the most notable suggested changes to the Norwegian appointment procedure is the 
codification of appointment procedure to the highest position in the Supreme Court. 
Appointment authority will still be conferred on the executive branch as in Poland, but 
according to detailed statutory provisions, the Polish President appoints First President of the 
Supreme Court upon proposals from the judiciary itself.188 Even though the actual judicial 
influence has been decreased by increasing number of candidates for the President to choose 
from, Polish judges enjoy a constitutionally guaranteed influence. The Commission’s suggested 
inclusion of an ad hoc council would remove the Norwegian selection of Chief Justice from the 
exclusive sphere of the King in Council. 
4.3. The implications of legal cultural context 
4.3.1. The politicization of a seemingly ideal selection model  
This functional comparison has demonstrated that the Norwegian and Polish judicial 
appointment mechanisms are both similar and different. It is remarkable how a formally strong 
Polish appointment procedure, secured in the country’s supreme source of law, failed to 
safeguard judicial independence. This chapter aims to uncover how legal cultural differences 
could explain why the Polish system was susceptible to political manipulation and assess 
whether the suggested changes will sufficiently protect the Norwegian judicial independence. 
Analysing all cultural elements of the LCM189 would be too extensive a task, and I have 
therefore made a limited selection based on what research publications identify as most 
influential to the Polish constitutional crisis.  
The analysis will start by contrasting Norwegian and Polish constitutional history, which 
provides background to the current framework. Within the institutional framework of the LCM, 
the focal point is the courts’ right and duty to perform constitutional review, which is an 
essential check on the executive and legislative branches. Within the model’s intellectual 
structure, the emphasis is on the impact of method, judicial career and the fundamental 
 
188 Art. 183 para. 3 of the Polish Constitution. 
189 See 1.3.1 above. 
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importance of public confidence for judicial independence. It is also necessary to address 
implications of the apparent tension between democratic legitimacy and judicial independence 
reflected in Norwegian and Polish appointments. The objective is to utilize the insight into 
contributing factors in the assessment of the proposed statutory changes to Norwegian 
appointment procedure.   
4.3.2. Constitutional history 
Executive control over judicial appointments is not considered problematic by European 
recommendations if “restrained by legal culture and traditions, which have grown over a long 
time.”190 This clearly applies to Norway, with the world’s second oldest Constitution and 
tradition of separation of powers that predate even its drafting.191 The country has not 
experienced much external political pressure after the Second World War, which has allowed 
the legal culture to develop uninterrupted.  
In contrast to this, Poland is a relatively new, post-communist democracy where respect for 
institutions and the Constitution lack sufficient time to develop.192 In fact, some argue legal 
constitutionalism has made the Constitution an “elite instrument”.193 Furthermore, periodic 
totalitarian rule and communist leadership seems to have created a tendency to gravitate 
towards centralised power.194 Over time, the lack of tradition and support for separation of 
powers affected the mindset and intentions of the executive branch and created an expectation 
that courts function as an extension of the political leadership.195 This is interchangeably 
connected to other factors addressed in this chapter, such as public confidence, which is not 
achieved overnight by judicial reform. Such lack of respect for the Constitution makes it easier 
to perform indirect changes to its principles through ordinary statutory amendments.196  
These differences might imply that the Polish crisis has limited relevance to Norwegian policy 
on judicial appointments. Indeed, the long tradition of separation of powers and 
parliamentarism provides a more robust framework for judicial independence. However, 
 
190 European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2007), CDL-AD(2007)028-e 
paras. 5 and 45.  
191 Sunde (2012) pp. 497-498. 
192 See Zoll and Wortham (2019); Halmai (2019) p. 320.  
193 Halmai (2019) with further references. 
194 See Kosař, Baroš and Dufek (2019); Halmai (2019). 
195 Kosař, Baroš and Dufek (2019) p. 459.  
196 Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and Koch (2020) p. 317; Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (2019).  
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populist parties have gained ground in countries with a variety of traditions. To not take notice 
and learn which factors could increase the likelihood of a similar constitutional crisis is an 
opportunity missed.  
4.3.3. Judicial review of constitutionality 
Indirect and informal changes of the Constitution is easier when there is no effective mechanism 
for reviewing the constitutionality of changes with binding effect.197 Formally, judicial 
independence had strong protection in both the Polish Constitution and ordinary statutes. But 
despite widespread consensus among legal scholars that the amendments affecting the judiciary 
contradicts fundamental constitutional principles,198 attempts at blocking these developments 
have been unsuccessful. According to legal scholars, the principles of the Constitution has been 
indirectly altered through ordinary statutes and narrow constitutional interpretation.199 
Additionally, nonconformity is countered using other statutory provisions to make such acts 
appear legal.200 Unfortunately, any conflict between the Constitution and ordinary statutes is 
largely left unchecked or indeed legitimised due to a disarmed Constitutional Tribunal.201 
The implications for this research could be that constitutional and statutory provisions are 
ineffective safeguards, open to misuse through interpretation and amendments. However, the 
Norwegian judiciary has a wider arsenal of ‘swords’ than its Polish colleagues. Without a 
separate constitutional tribunal, the Supreme Court has authority to review the constitutionality 
of legislation and administrative acts.202 In fact, courts on all tiers of the court hierarchy can 
(and are obligated to) do so.203 Despite having a similar option, Polish judges outside the 
Constitutional Tribunal have traditionally been very reluctant (and arguably, lacking in culture 
and training) to consider a statute unconstitutional and refuse its application.204 Some argue that 
options of direct review provided by article 8 of the Constitution remains unused,205 indicating 
 
197 Sadurski (2019a) p. 58 ff; Gersdorf and Pilich (2020) p. 10 ff; Halmai (2019) p. 322; Langford and Berge 
(2019) on the influence of review on constitutional design. 
198 Bodnar (2018) pp. 648-649.  
199 Drinóczi and Bień-Kacała (2019); Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2019) refers to “statutory anticonstitutionalism”. 
200 Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2019) pp. 500-501.  
201 See Bodnar (2018) p. 641 ff.; Pap and Śledzińska-Simon (2018); Halmai (2019); Gajda-Roszczynialska and 
Markiewicz (2020), claiming that “nobody in their right mind would see the Constitutional Tribunal as a 
guardian of the Constitution”. 
202 Smith (2017b). 
203 Art. 89 of the Norwegian Constitution; Schei (2014) p. 5 ff. 
204 See Sadurski (2019a) p. 86. 
205 Ibid. p. 86; Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and Koch (2020) pp. 293-294. 
37 
 
a reluctance to question legislation’s presumption of constitutionality. Norwegian courts need 
constitutional provisions against which to exercise judicial review, which supports the 
suggested further codification of the appointment procedure, at least in part on constitutional 
level. 
4.3.4. Weaponizing legal positivism and formalism 
Some suggest that Polish legal method and ideals of justice has been contributing factors in the 
constitutional crisis.206 For a country battling foreign occupation for decades, codes became an 
expression of both legal identity and political control.207 A formalistic, text-focused 
interpretation of acts has therefore provided protection against oppressive forces. Even after 
transitioning to democracy, “the cult of the statutory law and its literal interpretation” has 
remained a defining characteristic of Polish legal method.208  
This seems to have been weaponised by the Government using a “legalistic smokescreen” to 
veil unconstitutional amendments as constitutional.209 For instance, the constitutional 
requirement that members of the NCJ are chosen “amongst the judges” in a strictly formalistic 
interpretation does not mean chosen by judges.210 The phrase “constitution-hostile 
interpretation” has been used, describing a way of emphasising the importance of observing the 
constitution whilst simultaneously pointing to internal contradictions and calling it a 
“constitution for elites”.211 The Norwegian legal method would complicate such argumentation, 
as it requires a more contextual and principle-focused interpretation. Statutes are intentionally 
fragmentary and abstractly formulated, aimed at pragmatism and unification of law by courts.212 
This provides an extra barrier where the wording of the Constitution does not explicitly forbid 
certain illiberal changes, and  could make the courts more capable of fighting unconstitutional 
amendments.  
This could indicate that extensive codification that restrict judges’ room for interpretation is 
pointless. If the Norwegian Constitution had a provision stating that judicial members of the 
JAB are chosen from “amongst the judges”, the legal method would require courts to consider 
 
206 Matczak (2020); Zoll and Wortham (2019) p. 930 ff; Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2019). 
207 Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and Koch (2020) pp. 294 – 300. 
208 Gersdorf and Pilich (2020). 
209 Matczak (2020); Śledzińska-Simon (2018); Bernatt and Ziółkowski (2019). 
210 See Art. 187 para. 1 (2) of the Polish Constitution; Matczak (2020). 
211 Zajadło (2018) p. 8. 
212 Helland and Koch (2014) p. 108 ff.  
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other provisions, preparatory works, case law, practice and consensus amongst legal scholars. 
Longstanding practice and consensus like in Poland would resist an interpretation that allows 
Parliament to choose all members. However, the text of a statute is also the clearest expression 
of the intentions of the legislator. If there is a desire to secure judicial independence in 
appointments, a codification as suggested by the Commission would instruct the courts to 
enforce this if needed and limit the scope of interpretation. The current statutory silence 
regarding the discretion of the King in Council leaves it open for courts to rely on other sources, 
such as preparatory works, which could also be used to support an argument in favour of wide-
ranging executive discretion.213 Although Norwegian legal method could provide extra 
protection of judicial independence, it is primarily the role of the legislator to shape the direction 
of the law.  
4.3.5. The effect of public confidence on de facto and de jure judicial 
independence 
Low public confidence in the judiciary arguably makes it easier to cloak amendments as 
democratisation, as they “reinforce negative impressions that already exist”.214 Public 
confidence concerns the public’s attitude towards the judiciary, and high levels thus imply an 
optimistic attitude towards judges’ conduct.215 For Poland, surveys reveal that perceived 
independence of courts and judges is relatively low. According to the Eurobarometer, 24 % and 
31 % perceived the independence of the judiciary as very bad and fairly bad, respectively. 216 
In comparison, surveys consistently show high levels of public confidence in Norway.217  
Countries with high degrees of de facto independence often have high public confidence.218 
However, this does not necessarily require high levels of de jure judicial independence: Based 
on the 2016 EU Justice Scoreboard, Gutmann and Voigt found a negative correlation between 
de jure and de facto judicial independence.219 De facto judicial independence actually correlated 
 
213 NOU 1999: 19 at 7.5.3.3 emphasises that the executive has the option to reject candidates. 
214 Gersdorf and Pilich (2020) p. 33. See also Śledzińska-Simon (2018) p. 1866 ff; Sadurski (2019a) p. 9 
describes low trust in institutions in general.  
215 The terms “confidence” and “trust” are often used interchangeably, but I find “confidence” more suitable in 
this context. See Urbániková and Šipulová (2018) pp. 2114-2115. 
216 European Commission (2020), Flash Eurobarometer FL483. 
217 In 2019, 83 % of participants had high or very high confidence in the courts. Available in Norwegian at: 
<https://www.domstol.no/arsrapport-2019/nokkeltall-2019/#tiltro>, accessed 25 November 2020.  
218 Garoupa and Magalhães (2020). 
219 Gutmann and Voigt (2018). 
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better with the public’s attitude towards the judiciary than formal rules and regulations.220 
Another factor worth noting is the negative effects that overemphasis on de jure judicial 
independence could have on public confidence. Garoupa and Magalhães warns that an 
overemphasis on securing formal judicial independence could actually create “an accountability 
problem”, and points to the importance of balancing judicial independence and accountability 
to secure public confidence.221 Poland had a strong focus on de jure judicial independence 
during transformation from communism, but the resulting lack of accountability seems to have 
affected public confidence negatively.222 Low public confidence make democratisation claims 
easier to justify, and short-term reforms fails to visibly improve public confidence and de facto 
judicial independence. 
Norway has high levels of public confidence and de facto judicial independence despite limited 
statutory protection, in line with Gutmann and Voigt’s hypothesis. But emphasis on de jure 
independence is often a response to already unsatisfactory conditions for the judiciary and does 
not mean that increasing de jure independence would negatively affect de facto independence 
where public confidence and de facto independence is already high.223 However, the potential 
risk of negatively affecting public confidence by overemphasising de jure independence is 
worth noting, and maintaining public confidence is highly prioritised by both court 
commissions and the ministry.224 In the recent report, public confidence and democratic 
legitimacy are grouped together as considerations to balance against judicial independence,225 
which demonstrates the strong link between public confidence and parliamentary traditions in 
Norwegian legal culture. The studies therefore serve as a caution against overemphasising 
formal protection of judicial independence to such a degree that accountability or legitimacy, 
and therefore potentially public confidence, is impacted negatively. 
4.3.6. Judicial education and career 
Judicial education and career have been identified as factors that might affect the risk of 
political influence at the time of appointment. It is common to differentiate between civil and 
common law systems of judicial careers, where the former is characterised by a separate judicial 
 
220 Rios-Figueroa and Staton (2012). 
221 Garoupa and Magalhães (2020). 
222 Śledzińska-Simon (2018); Urbániková and Šipulová (2018). 
223 Urbániková and Šipulová (2018). 
224 NOU 1999: 19 at 5.2; Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000–2001) at 5.5; NOU 2020: 11 at 4.2. 
225 NOU 2020: 11 pp. 37-38. 
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career path right out of law school and the latter bases appointments on more senior lawyers 
with previous professional experience.226 In a system where judges are appointed based on 
experience, the risk of political influence is largest at the initial appointment as promises of 
advancement has less impact once appointed.227 
Poland has a civil law form of judicial career path. Future judges are enrolled in a separate 
school (National School of Judiciary and Public Prosecution) and could become judges without 
previous work experience.228 It is possible but difficult for legal professionals to get into the 
judicial environment, which indicates a very closed system and potential for lack of internal 
independence.229 Furthermore, this educational model seems to lack political accountability and 
democratic legitimacy.230 A system like the Polish could therefore isolate the judiciary to a 
larger extent than in a common law judicial career and contribute to the public distrust.231  
These circumstances might have made it easier for the ruling party to justify increased political 
influence on appointments through media smear-campaigns, which includes comparing judges 
to fascist collaborators232 and pejoratively dubbing them a “special caste” of people needing 
increased legitimacy.233 The judicial career system has implications on diversity, transparency, 
public confidence, accountability and democratic legitimacy. It is an advantage that Norwegian 
judges have a diverse background resembling the common law tradition,234 where judges in all 
three tiers should be recruited amongst legal professionals with varied professional 
background.235 The recent Court Commission used the absence of a separate judicial career-
path and constitutional tribunal as arguments against having judges in a majority on the JAB, 
emphasising that judges’ powers of review require strong democratic legitimacy.236  
A lesson from the Polish crisis is the importance of securing transparency and a sufficient 
degree of political influence in the appointment process, even in a system with a career judiciary 
and a constitutional tribunal. The arguments of the Polish Government and the Court 
 
226 See career models in Gee (2012). 
227 Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009) p. 11; Gee (2012) p. 134. 
228 Klimaszewska, Machnikowska and Koch (2020) p. 307; Zoll (2011). 
229 See Bodnar and Bojarski (2012). 
230 Zoll (2012) p. 308. 
231 Kühn (2012). 
232 See list of Government-led campaigns in Pech and Wachowiec (2020). 
233 Zoll and Wortham (2019); Bodnar (2018) p. 650. 
234 Aarli (2021) p. 77. 
235 The Courts of Justice Act section 55 para. 2 (2).  
236 NOU 2020: 11 p. 119.  
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Commission highlights an important factor in the constitutional crisis that needs to be further 
deliberated: an overemphasis on judicial independence vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy.   
4.3.7. Balancing democratic legitimacy and judicial independence 
Prior to 2015, some Polish legal scholars worried that the judiciary had been allowed too much 
autonomy to the detriment of democratic legitimacy.237 As feared, recent reforms were framed 
as democratisation of the judicial branch. Evidently, the procedure of appointments should 
reflect that both judicial independence and democratic legitimacy are considered.  
Maximising democratic legitimacy creates a risk of politicising judicial appointments.238 To 
confer appointment authority on political branches allows those branches to choose who 
performs checks on them and potentially select judges with political biases. Whilst recognising 
this, both Court Commissions recommended that the King in Council keep authority over 
appointments due to Norwegian constitutional and historical traditions and their requirement of 
legitimacy.239 A worry with increasing de jure judicial independence and self-governance was 
that the judiciary could lose touch with society, become isolated and lack diversity. Such fear 
seems justified considering post-communist reforms in Poland, where the remedy against 
centralised state power was “extreme depoliticization”, “one-sided checks on the elected 
branches” and “empowering [of] technocratic elitist institutions (especially the judiciary)”.240 
Consequently, overemphasis on judicial independence seems instead to have harmed it, and 
lack of legitimacy, low public confidence and history of centralised power made dismantling 
checks and balances on the political branches easier to justify. 
To completely remove political aspects from appointments seems unrealistic and overlooks the 
fact that parliamentary traditions like the Polish and the Norwegian require mutual checks and 
balances.241 Upholding democratic legitimacy is particularly important for courts that review 
the constitutionality of acts and has a role in developing law, rather than functioning as a 
mouthpiece of it.242 Whilst briefly addressing increased focus on judicial independence 
 
237 See Zoll (2012) p. 305, referring to a “cloning system”. 
238 NOU 1999: 19 at 5; Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) at 8.8.2.; NOU 2020: 11 p. 115; see also 
Garoupa and Magalhães (2020) on accountability vs. independence.  
239 NOU 1999: 19 at 7.5.2-7.5.4; Ot.prp. nr. 44 (2000-2001) at 8.8.3 and 8.5; NOU 2020: 11 pp. 114-115.  
240 Kosař, Baroš and Dufek (2019) p. 430. 
241 See Smith (2012); Jackson (2012) p. 73; Zoll (2012); Garoupa and Ginsburg (2009) p. 17.  
242 On the political functions of the Supreme Court, see Smith (2012); Schei (2011). 
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internationally,243 the Commissions tackle the gap between Norwegian appointments and 
international recommendations by citing other similar systems, distinguishing the role of the 
Supreme Court from jurisdictions with constitutional tribunals and emphasising parliamentary 
requirements for legitimacy.244 The latest Commission has gone a bit further towards 
acknowledging the risks associated with strong executive influence, as the balance is shifted 
slightly towards independence.245  
The cautious choice not to transfer powers to a council of judges but keep a broadly composed 
board, in which no group has majority, does not sacrifice legitimacy on the altar of judicial 
independence. This ensures a balance between democratically elected representatives of the 
executive branch and representatives of legal professions, including judges with a broad 
professional background. Keeping other tasks relating to judicial governance, such as 
administration and discipline, spread across several bodies and persons accountable to political 
branches reduces vulnerability for undue influence. 
4.4. Conclusions on the comparative study 
The aim of the comparative approach was to use lessons about the ongoing Polish crisis to 
assess changes to Norwegian appointment procedure. Comparing very different jurisdictions 
has its challenges, one of which is demonstrating how a legal culture so different than one’s 
own has relevance for future policies. I found that both countries face similar problems of 
allocating appointment authority amongst government branches, and in similar ways due to 
their parliamentary systems. Differences in the extent of statutory protection is culturally 
dependent, with the Polish functioning as a line of defence against relapse into authoritarianism 
and the dismantling of checks and balances. When this defence broke down, it did so due to the 
fragile nature of a separation of powers that lacked tradition, exposed to external pressure to 
conform in ways that caused culturally dependent factors to overreact.  
In most of these cultural factors Norway and Poland differ greatly, which will provide the 
Norwegian judiciary more resistance against a similar attack. High public confidence might 
make the Norwegian public less susceptible to such ideas, and the long tradition of separation 
of powers is probably better suited to withstand increased judicial self-governance.  Others are 
 
243 NOU 1999: 19 at 4.2. 
244 See NOU 1999: 19 chapter 5; NOU 2020: 11 p. 119, p. 215 ff.  
245 NOU 2020: 11 pp. 95-96, recognising the negative consequences of autonomy in some European countries.  
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similar and offer interesting insights into potential challenges for judicial independence in the 
long run, such as the importance of holding an increasingly powerful judiciary accountable, 
democratically legitimate and maintaining public confidence. An important lesson is that public 
confidence can work against judicial independence fairly quickly once populist governments 





5. Final reflections: looking back to find a 
path forward 
5.1. Summary of the findings 
Ensuring an independent judiciary is a continuous process in all modern democracies, in both 
post-communist nations in transition and older, established democracies facing new challenges. 
Independence depends not only on the country’s constitutional and statutory framework, but on 
legal cultural factors, tradition and historical context. The interplay between such factors creates 
challenges for the organisation of judicial appointment procedures.  
A study of the current Norwegian procedure revealed that the quite extensive formal authority 
conferred on the King in Council does not accurately reflect the more nuanced balance of 
powers in practice. The Court Commission suggested changes aimed at increasing the formal 
judicial independence of the judiciary beyond this practice. The functional comparative 
research demonstrates that the suggested changes as a whole make the procedure formally better 
equipped to safeguard judicial independence than the Polish. However, after including legal 
cultural factors in the discussion and looking at the consequences of increased self-governance 
in a new democracy like Poland, it does not seem to be sufficiently documented that mere 
formal improvement in itself is capable of ensuring a lasting, de facto independent judiciary. 
The Norwegian judiciary is supported by the existence of a deep-rooted culture of judicial 
independence that has grown over time through cooperation between the three branches. It 
benefits from public confidence, broad representation of legal professions and shared legal 
method, which provide a promising barrier against potential political attacks.  
However, I find the Polish crisis relevant. The ECtHR’s future interpretation of the requirement 
for a tribunal to be “independent” could have implications for Norwegian law. Furthermore, 
Norway is part of an international community, and international recommendations tend to 
recommend more judicial self-governance as a general solution to ensure judicial independence 
in old and new democracies alike.246 Such instruments have to some extent acknowledged 
traditions and culture in older democracies, but apparently less so for new democracies. 
 
246 See European Commission For Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission) (2010), Report CDL-
AD(2010)004-e para. 32, recommending that “states which have not yet done so consider the establishment of an 
independent judicial council or similar body” with judges in a majority. 
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Experiences by judiciaries currently battling for their independence demonstrate how too much 
autonomy could give the impression that the judiciary is beyond democratic control and risk it 
becoming a political target.247  
It is unclear from the scope of this thesis which long-term effects political attacks like those 
experienced in Poland could have in a legal culture where public confidence and de facto 
independence is already high, but developments in more fragile democracies is worrying. The 
legitimacy-problem that comes from a failure to acknowledge and account for growing judicial 
powers has relevance for a Norwegian Supreme Court with quite extensive normative authority. 
The Polish judiciary quickly lost both independence and checks on the political branches due 
to statutory changes that were beyond judicial review. This shows how formal changes is not 
only insufficient but could actually be counterproductive if they fail to consider legal cultural 
factors and historical context. Public confidence is key: if the public loses confidence that the 
judiciary is independent from the other branches, it could become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  
5.2. Are the proposed amendments necessary or 
sufficient? 
The question that remains is what the implications of these insights are for the report delivered 
by the Norwegian Commission of the Courts in September 2020. The long-term consequences 
of statutory amendments are always difficult to foresee and predict, but lessons from other 
countries such as Poland could be an indication of what one should keep in mind when planning 
for the future.   
The suggested amendments concern both the appointment itself and the composition and 
selection of members of the Board. The King in Council’s discretion is restricted to such a 
degree that judicial independence is formally strengthened vis-à-vis democratic legitimacy. The 
Board’s limited powers and broad composition compared to many European judicial councils 
limit the consequences of such a shift. Codification of existing practice helps avoid a similar 
unclarity regarding the executive’s prerogative as seen in Poland. Democratic legitimacy is 
maintained primarily through executive influence over the Board, and the cautious choice not 
 
247 For critical views on the use of judicial councils, see Kosař (2018); Kosař, Baroš and Dufek (2019) p. 443; 
Müller (2012) p. 940; Urbániková and Šipulová (2018). For an analysis of various models, see Garoupa and 
Ginsburg (2008).  
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to have judges in a majority. Empirical studies concerning the effects that composition of 
councils or boards has on judicial independence is scarce, but experiences from other countries 
suggest that neither a majority of political appointees nor of judges guarantee sustainable 
judicial independence.248 Opting for a balanced and pluralistic composition, avoiding either 
extreme, therefore seems rational. Improving transparency in the process and having clear 
qualification criteria both increase democratic accountability and raise the threshold for 
exerting undue pressure. The suggestions primarily amend ordinary statutes and could go a bit 
further in securing the Board’s role and composition in constitutional provisions. In Poland, the 
Constitution remains formally unamended whilst its principles are altered through 
interpretation and other statutes, facilitated by lack of judicial review. Norwegian legal method 
and judges’ ability and confidence to review legislation helps safeguard their independence, but 
constitutional codification provides better weapons for such review and protects against short-
term statutory changes.  
NOU 2020: 11 offers a balanced approach to the tension between judicial independence and 
democratic legitimacy, and the Commission’s reluctance to blindly follow international 
recommendations to increase judicial autonomy seems well-founded and indeed sensible. The 
goal should not be to achieve the highest possible level of judicial independence of the kind 
often hailed as the golden standard by international instruments. The Polish situation 
demonstrates that judicial independence and democratic legitimacy are not mutually exclusive, 
as the former seems to be better secured by checks and balances than it would by isolation of 
the judicial branch. Laws can be amended to fit the whims of political leaders given sufficient 
time. A more realistic objective might therefore be to make courts resilient against short-term 
statutory changes and delay the process, whilst maintaining public confidence and respecting 
legal cultural and historical traditions.  
 
248 See Müller (2012) p. 953 ff., discussing problems with judicial corporatism versus political influence using 
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